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1 The internal Backpage email attached by the AG states, “The content [of BigCity] will be pre-populated with millions of images 
from backpage where we hope to extract two words of the title, the phone number, and age of the person.  The images will need to be 
processed to where we crop an area most likely to give us a wholesome image.”  (Ex A)   
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and	commenting	on	illegal	or	actionable	content,	which	impermissibly	inflates	the	meaning	of	
“development”	to	the	point	of	eclipsing	immunity	from	publisher‐liability	established	by	Congress];	
Ascentive	LLC	v.	Opinion	Corp.	(EDNY	2011)	842	F.	Supp.2d	450,	476	[inviting	postings	then	altering	the	
way	postings	are	displayed	is	not	content	development];	Roommates,	supra,	521	F.3d	at	1174	
[encouragement,	enhancement	by	implication	or	development	by	inference	is	protected	conduct	under	
the	CDA];	Black	v.	Google	Inc	(N.D.	Cal	2010)	2010	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	82905,	*8	[even	if	defendants	
“sponsored	or	endorsed”	an	allegedly	defamatory	comment	posted	by	a	user,	“the	fact	remains	that	
Plaintiffs	seek	to	hold	it	liable	for	content	generated	by	a	third‐party”	and	defendants	are	entitled	to	
immunity	under	the	CDA].)				
	
This	Court	finds	Kimzey	v.	Yelp!	Inc	(9th	Cir	2016)	836	F.3d	1263	helpful.		Plaintiff	Kimzey	
complained	about	offensive	content	in	a	negative	business	review	posted	on	Yelp!	and	sought	to	hold	
Yelp!	liable.		Kimzey	alleged	that	Yelp!	Found	the	review	on	another	website,	reposted	the	offensive	
review	on	Yelp!	and	then	republished	the	review	as	an	advertisement	or	promotion	on	Google,	all	in	an	
effort	to	increase	online	traffic	to	Yelp!.		Kimzey’s	theory	was	that	by	repeatedly	reposting	the	“found”	
review	for	Yelp!’s	own	use,	Yelp!	developed	the	content.	(Id	at	1267)		The	Ninth	Circuit	rejected	Kimzey’s	
“artful	skirting	of	the	CDA’s	safe	harbor	provision.”		(Id	at	1266.)				
	
The	Ninth	Circuit	noted	that	Kimzey	never	specifically	alleged	that	Yelp!	authored	the	content	of	
the	statements	posted.		Instead,	the	allegations	were	that	Yelp!	adopted	the	statements	from	another	
website	and	transformed	them	into	its	own	stylized	promotions.		The	court	determined	that	the	
allegations	were	insufficient	to	avoid	immunity	under	the	CDA.		(Id	at	1268)		The	court	also	rejected	
Kimzey’s	“convoluted”	theory	that	Yelp!	transformed	the	review	into	its	own	advertisement	with	the	
creation	and	addition	of	a	star	rating	system	that	accompanied	the	promotion.		Although	this	
characterization	had	“superficial	appeal”	for	the	court,	the	court	found	that	accepting	the	theory	would	
extend	the	concept	of	“content	provider”	too	far	and	would	render	the	CDA’s	immunity	provision	
meaningless.		(Id	at	1269.)		The	court	stated	that	“Nothing	in	the	text	of	the	CDA	indicates	that	immunity	
turns	on	how	many	times	an	interactive	computer	service	publishes	‘information	provided	by	another	
information	content	provider.’”		(Ibid.)			
	
In	short,	courts	have	repeatedly	held	that	an	online	service	provider	is	protected	whether	he	
publishes	third‐party	content	for	the	first	time,	or	republishes	it	for	the	nth	time.		To	find	the	source	of	the	
liability	for	the	unlawful	or	actionable	content,	one	must	trace	the	pedigree	of	the	statement.		(Kimzey,	
supra,	836	F.3d	at	1268‐1269;	Jones,	supra,	755	F.3d	at	408‐409;	Doe	v.	Friendfinder	Network,	Inc,	540	
F.Supp.2d	288,	295‐296.)	
	
	
4. Removal	from	Protection	under	the	CDA	
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a. Victims’	Intellectual	Property	Rights	
The	People	assert	that	the	CDA	does	not	apply	because	Defendants	violated	the	victims’	rights	of	
publicity	when	Defendants	used	the	victims’	likenesses	posted	in	Backpage	ads	and	used	them	either	on	
BigCity	or	EvilEmpire	sites	without	the	victim’s	knowledge.		In	support,	the	People	cite	to	Doe	v.	
Backpage.com	LLC	(1st	Cir.	2016)	817	F.3d	12.		(AG	Supp.	9)		In	that	case,	plaintiffs	brought	claims	against	
Backpage	alleging	an	unauthorized	use	of	a	person’s	picture.		Plaintiffs	alleged	that	by	garnering	
advertising	revenues	from	advertisements	placed	by	their	traffickers,	Backpage	profited	from	the	
unauthorized	use	of	the	plaintiffs’	photographs.		The	plaintiffs	alleged	that	Backpage’s	use	of	their	images	
cannot	be	written	off	as	incidental	because	their	pictures	were	“the	centerpieces	of	commercial	
advertisements.”		(Id	at	27.)		The	court	found	that	although	Backpage	profited	from	the	sale	of	
advertisements,	“it	is	not	the	entity	that	benefits	from	the	misappropriation.”		Rather,	the	party	who	
benefits	from	the	misappropriation	is	the	person	who	placed	the	original	ad.		The	court	stated	“Matters	
might	be	different	if	Backpage	had	used	the	pictures	to	advertise	its	own	services…”		(Ibid.)					
The	People	assert	that	the	“matters	[that]	might	be	different”	are	present	here,	when	Defendants	
used	pictures	and	text	from	Backpage	ads	to	generate	new	ads	on	two	additional	websites.		In	response,	
Defendants	call	attention	to	the	fact	that	users	posting	on	Backpage.com	accept	the	website’s	Terms	of	
Use,	in	which	they	assign	all	intellectual	property	rights	and	agree	that	their	photos	and	content	may	be	
reposted.		(Def.	Supp.	10)			
	
The	right	of	publicity	derives	from	the	right	of	privacy.		Generally,	the	right	of	privacy	protects	an	
individual’s	peace	and	quiet.		The	right	of	publicity,	in	turn,	protects	an	economic	interest	a	person	has	in	
the	value	of	his	identity.		These	privacy	rights	are	personal.		(Hill	v.	National	Collegiate	Athletic	Assn	
(1994)	7	Cal.4th	1,	24.)		Thus,	the	prosecutor	does	not	have	standing	to	assert	this	right	on	behalf	of	the	
victims.		It	is	on	that	crucial	fact	that	sets	this	case	apart	from	Doe	v.	Friendfinder	Network	Inc	(2008)	540	
F.Supp.	2d	288,	304.	(See	AG	Supp.	9)		Friendfinder	involved	a	civil	plaintiff	seeking	damages	for	the	
violation	of	her	right	to	publicity	after	an	unknown	person	created	a	profile	on	her	behalf,	without	her	
knowledge	or	consent,	and	Friendfinder	used	portions	of	that	profile	as	advertisements	to	increase	the	
profitability	of	their	business.		The	court	found	the	allegations	sufficient	to	survive	a	motion	to	dismiss.	
(Ibid.)			
	
The	People	lack	standing	to	assert	this	right.		Moreover,	existing	case	law	indicates	that	these	
additional	advertisements	are	permissible	attempts	at	search	engine	optimization	in	an	effort	to	increase	
the	visibility	of	the	information	provided	by	the	third	party.		(See	Asia	Econ.	Inst.	V.	Xcentric	Ventures	LLC	
(C.D.	Cal.	2011)		2011	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	145380,	*19	[increasing	the	prominence	of	a	page	in	internet	
searches	do	not	amount	to	“creation	or	development	of	information”].)		Indeed,	the	very	purpose	behind	
the	third	party’s	placing	the	ad	on	Backpage	was	to	provide	accessibility	to	the	public	on	a	large	scale.		(Cf	
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Ibid	[the	purpose	of	consumer	reports	is	to	provide	accessibility	to	the	public	on	a	grand	scale	and	
“increasing	the	visibility	of	a	statement	is	not	tantamount	to	altering	its	message”].)				
	
b. Prosecution	for	pimping	under	Penal	Code	section	266H	
The	People	maintain	that	Defendants’	actions	were	not	neutral,	and	they	instead	took	an	active	
role	to	further	prostitution	and	seek	to	hold	Defendants	responsible	for	their	own	misconduct,	not	for	the	
speech	of	others.		“This	is	not	a	case	against	Backpage,	a	website;	it	is	a	case	against	three	individual	
defendants	who	used	multiple	platforms	to	commercially	sexually	exploit	vulnerable	women	and	
children.”	(AG,	Supp	2)			
	
This	Court	finds	it	difficult	to	see	any	illegal	behavior	outside	of	the	reliance	upon	the	content	of	
speech	created	by	others.		The	whiff	of	illegality	is	detected	only	when	considering	the	alleged	content	of	
the	statements	contained	in	the	ads.		Indeed,	the	theory	of	prosecution	requires	the	presumption	that	
illegal	content	was	contained	in	the	ads,	i.e.,	that	the	ads	were	explicitly	for	prostitution.		Under	the	
prosecution’s	theory,	Defendants	would	become	liable	at	the	point	where	information	provided	from	
third	parties	was	transferred	to	the	additional	two	websites	because,	according	to	the	People,	Defendants	
transferred	the	information	intentionally	to	help	to	facilitate	prostitution.		(When	prostitution	
transactions	took	place	as	a	result	of	the	ads,	more	ads	would	be	placed.)		Yet,	the	general	actions	
required	(absent	consideration	of	speech	content)	to	repost	the	ads	would	not	be	illegal.			Thus,	the	
prosecution	depends	on	consideration	of	speech	provided	by	a	third	party.	
			
i.	 Theory	that	Defendant’s	derived	financial	support	from	prostitution			
The	People	maintain	that	Defendants	may	be	prosecuted	under	the	theory	is	that	defendants	
derived	support	from	the	earnings	of	another’s	act	of	prostitution.	(See	McNulty,	supra,	202	Cal.App.3d	at	
630	[stating	the	two	theories	of	prosecution	for	pimping].)		The	People	assert	that	the	allegations	are	that	
the	Defendants	“knowingly	derived	support	from	prostitution	earnings,	i.e.,	profited	from	prostitution”	
when	they	created	EvilEmpire	to	improve	Backpage’s	search	results	(search	engine	optimization)	and	
created	BigCity	to	expand	Backpage’s	share	of	“online	commercial	sex	market”	and	profits.		The	People	
maintain	that	pimping	will	be	shown	when	the	People	demonstrate	that	Defendants	acquired	income	
from	prostitution	resulting	from	advertisements	placed	in	Backpage.com.		The	People	assert	that	
Defendants	agreed	upon	a	business	model	to	maximize	the	receipt	of	prostitution	earnings	and	
committed	many	overt	acts	in	furtherance	of	this	objective.		(Opp.	3)			
In	support,	the	People	cite	to	People	v.	Grant	(2011)	195	Cal.App.4th	107.		Grant	discusses	a	
distinction	between	financial	support	received	by	the	prostitute	(illegal)	and	funds	paid	by	the	prostitute	
for	services	rendered	or	other	purposes	(legal).			The	appellate	court	made	clear	that	“the	statutory	
prohibition	does	not	preclude	a	person	from	accepting	a	known	prostitute’s	funds	gained	from	the	
prostitute’s	lawful	activities	or	for	purposes	other	than	the	person’s	support	and	maintenance.”		(Id	at	
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116.		See	also	Allen	v.	Stratton	(C.D.Cal.	2006)	428	F.Supp.2d	1064,	1072,	fn	7	[a	natural	reading	of	the	
pimping	statute	does	not	apply	to	an	individual	who	provides	a	legitimate	professional	service	to	a	
prostitute	even	if	paid	with	proceeds	earned	from	prostitution,	the	service	provider	derives	support	from	
his	own	services];	People	v.	Reitzke	(1913)	21	Cal.App.740,	742	[a	legitimate	defense	to	pimping	is	that	a	
prostitute	loaned	the	defendant	money	for	the	purpose	of	going	into	the	saloon	business,	or	for	any	other	
purpose	except	the	purpose	of	being	supported	or	maintained	by	the	prostitute].)				
	
Here,	there	is	no	dispute	that	Backpage	charged	money	for	the	placement	of	advertisements.		Does	
this	qualify	as	services	rendered	for	legal	purposes?		Given	the	services	provided	by	the	online	publisher,	
the	answer	to	that	question	is	yes.		Providing	a	forum	for	online	publishing	is	a	recognized	legal	purpose	
that	is	generally	provided	immunity	under	the	CDA.		This	immunity	has	been	extended	by	the	courts	to	
apply	to	functions	traditionally	associated	with	publishing	decisions,	such	as	accepting	payment	for	
services	and	editing.		(See	e.g.,	Fields,	supra,	2016	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	105768,	*11‐12	[Twitter	immune	
against	claims	that	it	provided	ISIS	material	support	through	use	of	its	services	because	protected	
publishing	activity	included	decisions	about:	what	third	party	content	may	be	posted	online;	monitoring,	
screening,	and	deletion	of	content;	and	whether	to	prevent	posting].)		In	fact,	the	People	acknowledge	
that	the	mere	act	of	accepting	money	for	postings	is	permissible.		(Opp.	9)			The	case	law	is	clear	that,	as	
discussed	above,	immunity	is	removed	when	the	service	provider	affirmatively	acts	to	create	the	
offensive	content.			
	
This	Court	draws	support	for	its	conclusion	from	cases	in	other	jurisdictions.		In	Doe,	for	example,	
the	plaintiffs	alleged	that,	beginning	at	age	15,	they	were	trafficked	through	advertisements	on	
Backpage.com	and	Backpage	profited	from	their	victimization.		The	plaintiffs	filed	suit	against	
Backpage.com	for	violating	the	Trafficking	Victims	Protection	Reauthorization	Act	(“TVPRA”)	which	
prohibits	knowingly	benefitting	financially	from	sex	trafficking.		(Doe,	supra,	817	F.3d	at	15.)		Plaintiffs’	
theory	was	that	Backpage	engaged	in	a	course	of	conduct	designed	to	facilitate	sex	traffickers’	efforts	to	
advertise	their	victims	on	the	website	by	only	charging	for	posts	made	in	the	“Adult	Entertainment”	
section,	and	allowing	users	to	pay	an	additional	fee	for	“Sponsored	Ads,”	which	increased	the	number	of	
times	the	advertisement	appeared.		(Id.	at	17.)		Plaintiffs	also	alleged	that	Backpage	tailored	its	posting	
requirements	to	make	trafficking	easier	by	not	blocking	repeated	attempts	to	post	and	by	allowing	users	
to	pay	anonymously	through	prepaid	credit	cards	or	digital	currencies.		(Id	at	16.)				
	
Backpage	moved	to	dismiss	the	suit	under	Federal	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	12(b)	(6).		The	district	
court	granted	the	motion	and	found	that	the	CDA	provided	immunity	from	the	claims.		On	review,	the	
First	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	affirmed	the	district	court’s	ruling.	The	First	Circuit	rejected	the	plaintiffs’	
assertion	that	Backpage	participated	in	an	affirmative	course	of	conduct	and	actual	participation	in	sex	
trafficking.		The	court	noted	that	the	challenged	were	traditional	publisher	functions,	and	thus	immune	
from	suit	under	the	CDA.		(Id.	at	20)		The	court	also	noted	that	the	plaintiffs	were	harmed	when	they	
were	trafficked	through	the	advertisements.		Without	the	content	of	those	advertisements	–	which	was	
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created	by	a	third	party	‐	there	would	be	no	harm.		(Id.	at	20.)		The	court	dismissed	the	plaintiffs’	
assertion	that	Backpage’s	decisions	about	what	measures	to	implement	demonstrate	a	deliberate	
attempt	to	make	sex	trafficking	easier.		The	court	stated,	“Whatever	Backpage’s	motivations,	those	
motivations	do	not	alter	the	fact	that	the	complaint	premises	liability	on	the	decisions	that	Backpage	is	
making	as	a	publisher	with	respect	to	third‐party	content.”		(Id	at	21.)			The	court	went	on	to	state	“even	if	
we	assume,	for	argument’s	sake,	that	Backpage’s	conduct	amounts	to	‘participation	in	a	[sex	trafficking]	
venture’	–	a	phrase	that	no	published	opinion	has	yet	interpreted	–	the	TVPRA	claims	as	pleaded	premise	
that	participation	on	Backpage’s	actions	as	a	publisher	or	speaker	of	third‐party	content.		The	strictures	
of	section	230(c)	foreclose	such	suits.”		(Ibid.)		The	First	Circuit	specifically	held	that	“claims	that	a	
website	facilitates	illegal	conduct	through	its	posting	rules	necessarily	treat	the	website	as	a	publisher	or	
speaker	of	content	provided	by	third	parties	and,	thus,	are	precluded	by	section	230(c)(1).”		(Id.	at	22.)		
	
Similarly,	in	M.A.	ex	rel.	P.D.	v.	Village	Voice	Media	Holdings,	LLC	(E.D.	Mo.	2011)	809	F.Supp.2d	
1041,	the	plaintiff	sought	to	hold	Backpage	responsible	for	her	victimization	through	sex	trafficking	that	
took	place	as	a	result	of	advertisements	placed	on	Backpage.com.		The	plaintiff	alleged	that	Backpage	
accepted	a	fee	for	such	advertisements,	knew	that	advertisements	were	for	prostitution	and	“created	
information”	by	hosting	a	search	engine,	providing	instructions	for	increased	visibility	of	advertisements	
and	allowed	for	anonymous	payment.		(M.A.,	supra,	809	F.Supp.2d	at	1044.)		The	court	granted	the	
Defendant’s	motion	to	dismiss	on	the	basis	that	the	CDA	provided	immunity.		The	court	reasoned	that	
there	was	no	allegation	that	Backpage	was	responsible	for	the	actual	development	of	any	portion	of	the	
content	of	the	advertisements	or	specifically	encouraged	the	development	of	the	offensive	nature.		(Id	at	
1052.)		(See	also	Opp.	21;	Def.	21‐22)			
	
Even	in	viewing	the	offer	of	proof	of	the	evidence	most	favorable	to	the	Attorney	Generals	office,	
this	case	is	very	similar	to	the	above	cases.		As	alleged	here,	the	prostitution	took	place	as	a	result	of	an	
advertisement	placed	by	a	third	party.		Backpage’s	decision	to	charge	money	to	allow	a	third	party	to	
post	content,	as	well	as	any	decisions	regarding	posting	rules,	search	engines	and	information	on	how	a	
user	can	increase	ad	visibility	are	all	traditional	publishing	decisions	and	are	generally	immunized	under	
the	CDA.	In	short,	the	victimization	resulted	from	the	third	party’s	placement	of	the	ad,	not	because	
Backpage	profiting	from	the	ad	placement.			
	
Conclusion	
	 	
The	First	Amendment	“makes	the	individual,	not	government,	the	keeper	of	his	tastes,	beliefs,	and	
ideas.”		Paris	Adult	Theater	I	v.	Slaton	(1973)	413	US	49,	73	(Douglas,	J.,	dissenting).	At	the	same	time,	the	
Court	understands	the	importance	and	urgency	in	waging	war	against	sexual	exploitation.		Regardless	of	
the	grave	potential	for	harm	that	may	result	in	the	exercise	of	this	article	of	faith,	Congress	has	precluded	
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liability	for	online	publishers	for	the	action	of	publishing	third	party	speech	and	thus	provided	for	both	a	
foreclosure	from	prosecution	and	an	affirmative	defense	at	trial.	Congress	has	spoken	on	this	matter	
and	it	is	for	Congress,	not	this	Court,	to	revisit.	
	
Court’s	ruling:	
Defendants’	demurrer	is	GRANTED.	
Defendants’	request	for	judicial	notice	is	DENIED.				
Further	court	dates	are	vacated.	
Bond	is	exonerated	for	each	Defendant.	
	
	
Dated:		December	9,	2016	
____________________________________	
Honorable	Michael	G.	Bowman	
Judge	of	the	Superior	Court	of	California		
County	of	Sacramento	
